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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the problem of spectrum
access decision-making for the Secondary Users (SUs) in the
cognitive radio networks. When the Primary Users (PUs) are
absent on certain frequency bandwidth, SUs can formulate a
queue and wait for the Base Station (BS) to serve. The queue of
the SUs will be dismissed if the PU is emerging in the system.
Leveraging the queueing game approaches, the decision-making
process of the SUs that whether to queue or not is studied.
Both individual equilibrium and social optimization strategies
are derived analytically. Moreover, the optimal pricing strategy
of the service provider is investigated as well. Our proposed
algorithms and corresponding analysis are validated through
simulation studies.
Index Terms—queueing game; pricing; Nash equilibrium
strategies; social optimizations; spectrum access; cognitive radio
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fast growing wireless market, the frequency spectrum
is one of the most scarce and valuable resources. However,
some surveys for actual measurements show that most of
the allocated spectrum is largely under-utilized [1]. Cognitive
radio (CR) is known as an efficient way to improve spectrum
utilization and a promising technology to enable dynamic
spectrum access by exploiting the unused spectrum in the
wireless environments [1]. In a cognitive radio network (CRN),
there are two types of users, namely, licensed primary users
(PUs) who have the licensed spectrum access opportunities
and unlicensed secondary users (SUs) who can only utilize
the spectrum which the PUs do not occupy. To exploit limited
spectrum efficiently, In a CRN, the SUs are allowed to
opportunistically to access licensed spectrum bands when PU
transmission is not presented, which is able to significantly
improve the spectrum utilization efficiency.
During last decades, the technology of CR has attracted
plenty of interests and has been investigated extensively,
among which, how to explore the access opportunities and
regular the spectrum access without harming the PUs are of
consistent research interests [2]. Recently, there is a particular
interest to apply the queueing theory [3] which is a natural
tool to analyze the transmission in the wireless networks or the
game theory [5] which is commonly used in developing opti-
mization algorithms to address the spectrum access problems.
Intriguingly, applying queue theory with pricing strategies
also brings a novel view on understanding the SU’s behavior
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and cognitive market policies, which can be traced from the
original works of [6]-[9] that study the equilibrium behavior
in queueing systems. We call it the queueing game in the
following to highlight the key issues in this area: by utilizing
the information of queue and considering its own payoff, the
user needs to make the decision on whether to queue or
not. Recent works of [10]-[12] have leveraged the queueing
game to the spectrum access control in the CRN. In [10], the
authors present an observed queue model with SUs acquiring
for transmission from a cognitive base station (CBS). It is
also assumed that PUs emerged periodically for transmission
opportunities. During the PU’s transmission period, CBS stops
serving SUs and SUs remained in the queue waiting for the
re-operation of CBS. Based on this model, a SU’s decision
strategy, i.e., joining the queue or balk, is investigated and the
pricing policy was studied. Authors of [11] extend the work
of [10] to an unobserved case and analyzed the strategies of
SUs and CBS. In [12], the strategy of delay sensitive SUs is
explicitly considered. The authors also consider pricing and
load balancing effect in the spectrum access decision-making
in both monopoly and duopoly markets. Authors of [13] also
utilizes the concept of the queueing game and model users as
selfish players that compete with each other by choosing the
optimal transmission threshold maximizing system throughput.
It can be well observed that the queueing game is an
effective tool for analyzing the SUs’ behaviors in spectrum
access. The motivation of this work is to extend the previous
works and overcome their limitations. It can be found that the
previous works focused on the case that a separate CBS is used
for serving the SUs. Therefore, when the PU emerges, the SUs
can remain in the queue of the CBS and wait for PUs finishing
the transmission. In such case, the queue of the CBS can be
modeled and analyzed by a server breakdown model. However,
the installation and deployment of the CBS bring additional
cost and it may not be practical in some cognitive systems. In
contrast, we consider there is only one BS in the system. The
primary job of the BS is to serve the incoming PUs, while
it will utilize the time when the PU frequency band is not
occupied to serve SUs. Specially, when the PU comes, the BS
no long holds the information of the queue and all the SUs
are forced to leave the queue. When a SU decides to join the
queue and wait for spectrum access opportunity, the sojourn
time induces a cost and if its job has been finished, the SU can
receive a reward. In addition, if PU emerges, the SUs who have
to leave the queue without any reward or compensate. Under
this model, we study the SU’s decision-making process, i.e.,
whether to join for spectrum access or balk, and the pricing
based spectrum access control.
2Compared to previous works, the main contributions of this
paper are as follows. We first model the interaction among
SUs in a partially observed queue as a noncooperative game.
Based on the queueing analysis and payoff model, we then
analyze both individually equilibrium strategy and optimal
social welfare strategy of the SUs about whether to join or
not. Furthermore, we study the BS pricing strategy for the
system such that the individually equilibrium decision of SUs
can coincide with the socially optimal strategy that optimizes
the total welfare of the whole system. Our presented analysis
and algorithm are demonstrated by the simulation studies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model including the queue model and
profit of SUs. We present the individual equilibrium strategies,
social welfare optimization and pricing studies in Section III.
Our presented algorithm and analysis are demonstrated in
Section IV through simulation studies, and finally we conclude
this work in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Queue Model
The system model can be found in Fig. 1. We consider
a CRN consists of multiple SUs, one BS and multiple PUs.
When PUs are absent, the BS can utilize the available spectrum
to serve the SUs. If the PU is entering the system, due
to its priority, the BS has to drop the service connection
of the SUs and starts to serve PU. Meanwhile, the queue
consisting of the SUs is no long exists and all SUs should
leave the queue and seek for other transmission opportunities.
We consider the data arrival rate of the SU follows the Poisson
process at rate λ and the arrival of the PU follows Poisson
process at rate ξ. The service requirements of the SUs are i.i.d
with exponential distribution µ. The First-Come-First-Served
(FCFS) rule is applied for determining the service order of
SUs at the BS. The length of the service time of the PU is
also assumed to be exponentially distributed with rate η. The
above considered queue model is a common assumption in
some previous literatures, e.g. [10] [11].
The state of the system at time t is represented by a pair
(N(t), I(t)), where N(t) is the length of queue, i.e., the
number of SUs in the system. I(t) denotes the working status
of the BS, with 1 standing for serving SUs and 0 showing that
the BS is serving the PUs. So based on the system model,
when I(t) = 0, we also have N(t) = 0. We assume when
being successfully served by the BS, the SU can receive a
reward. While waiting in the queue, the delay cost of the SU is
a function of its sojourn time. Based on the total payoff which
is the difference between the reward and the cost, SU can
make the decision on whether to join the queue and waiting
for spectrum access or not. The payoff models are presented
in the following.
B. Profit Model
We assume when being successfully served by the BS, the
SU receives a reward ̟s. We also assume that the cost of
staying in the queue is χ(T ) where T is the sojourn time in
the system representing the time that SU stays in the queue.
Fig. 1. System Model
Fig. 2. Transition-rate diagram
χ(T ) should be an increasing function of T and one simple
linear example is that χ(T ) = CT where C is the unit cost.
Then the profit of the SU can be given as
R := ̟s − CT. (1)
Accordingly, we can have the definition of the expected
individual profit
Definition 1. When there are n SUs in the queue, the expected
profit of the arriving SU can be defined as
U(n) := θs(̟s − CE(Qn)), (2)
where θs is the probability that the SU can be served and
E(Qn) is the expected sojourn time related to n.
Moreover, we can also define the social welfare as follows.
Definition 2. The social welfare of the considered system is
given by
S(q) := λρs̟s − CE(N), (3)
where ρs is the fraction of SUs that join the queue and leave
after being served. E(N) is the mean number of SUs.
In the following, we consider the SUs are risk natural and
try to maximize their profits. We also assume the SUs are
identical i.e., a symmetric game is assumed. In addition, we
also consider that when the SU enters the system at time t,
all the system parameters including profit model are known
except the queue length N(t) and SU can only observe I(t)
upon arrival, i.e., a partially observed queue is considered.
III. QUEUEING GAME FOR SPECTRUM ACCESS:
EQUILIBRIUM AND PRICING
A. Stationary Probability and Expected Sojourn Time
After entering the system, the SU is able to decide whether
to join the queue waiting for spectrum access or not based
3on its own observation, i.e. the profit. Thus, there are only
two pure strategies, join and balk, and a mixed strategy is
specified by the joining probability q ∈ [0, 1] of a SU that
finds the BS is not serving PU. Therefore, the effective arrival
rate is λ′ = λq. For the considered system, we first obtain the
stationary probabilities p(N(t), I(t)). Based on the transition
rate diagram in Fig. 2, we are able to obtain the stationary
probabilities p(N(t), I(t)) based on the following balance
equations,
ηp(0, 0) = ξ
+∞∑
n=0
p(n, 1), (4)
(λ
′
+ ξ)p(0, 1) = µp(1, 1) + ηp(0, 0), (5)
(λ
′
+ξ+µ)p(n, 1) = λ
′
p(n−1, 1)+µp(n+1, 1), ∀n ≥ 1, (6)
p(0, 0) +
+∞∑
n=0
p(n, 1) = 1. (7)
To obtain p(0, 0) and p(n, 1), we have following observa-
tion.
Proposition 1. The stationary probability p(0, 0) and p(n, 1)
can be given as follows,
p(0, 0) =
ξ
η + ξ
,
p(n, 1) =
η(1 − x(λ′))x(λ′ )n
η + ξ
(8)
where x(λ′ ) is
x(λ
′
) =
(λ
′
+ µ+ ξ)−
√
(λ′ + µ+ ξ)2 − 4λ′µ
2µ
. (9)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
In order to achieve the expected profit, from (2), θs and
E(Qn) should be obtained at the first place. Consider a SU
enters the network at state (n, 1) upon arrival and decides
to join the queue. This SU may leave either due to service
completion or due to a PU entering. For its service completion,
the SU has to wait for a sum of n+1 independent exponentially
distributed times with parameter µ. For the case that the PU
enters, the SU has to wait for an exponentially distributed time
with parameter ξ. Hence, the sojourn time of the SU in the
system is given as N = min(Ln, Q), where Ln follows a
Gamma distribution with parameters n + 1 and µ. Q is an
exponentially distributed random variable with rate ξ, and Q
is independent of Ln. Therefore, we have θs = Pr(Ln < Q).
To this end, when considering N(t) and I(t) are known to the
SU, we can obtain the θs and E(Qn) in (2) as
θs =
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)n+1
,
E(Qn) =
1
ξ
(1− θs)n+1 ,
(10)
where n is the number of SUs in the queue. Then, we can use
(4) and (10) to address U(n) in (2) and then find the expected
profit of a SU that enters the queue with a certain probability.
B. Individually Equilibrium Strategy
With the results of the stationary probability and the ex-
pected sojourn time, the expected profit of a SU that enters
the queue with probability q˜ can be achieved as following,
Proposition 2. When there is frequency bandwidth available
for the SUs, the expected profit of a SU that enters the queue
with probability q˜ given that other SUs join the queue with
probability q is given by
Γ(q˜, q) = q˜
[(
̟s +
C
ξ
)
µ(1− x(λ′ ))
µ+ ξ − µx(λ′ ) −
C
ξ
]
(11)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
We can now process to find out the individually equilibrium
(IE) strategy of a SU and we have the following,
Theorem 1. In the considered model, a unique IE mixed
strategy exists, with joining probability qe given by
qe =


1, ̟s ∈ [ Cµ(1−κ) ,+∞),
Θ, ̟s ∈ (Cµ , Cµ(1−κ) ),
0, Otherwise.
(12)
where Θ = (µ̟s−C)(C+ξ̟s)λC̟s and κ = x(λ).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
From Theorem 1, we can observe that the IE is independent
of the PU’s service time. This is because the SU makes
decision only when PU is not being served and the SU can
not be aware of the PU’s information. However, the socially
equilibrium strategies of the SUs do depend on the pricing
strategies of the BS as well as the PU’s arrival rate. The
IE does not imply the social welfare optimality. Thus, in the
following, we investigate the social optimal strategy.
C. Social Optimization
Based on the definition of social welfare and previous results
of the stationary probabilities, we can arrive at the following
proposition,
Proposition 3. The expected social profit, given that the SUs
follow a mixed strategy with probability q of joining (i.e.
arriving SUs that find an BS not serving the PU enters with
probability q, while the rest choose to balk without being
served) is given by
S(q) =
ηx(λ
′
)[µ̟s(1− x(λ′ ))− C]
(ξ + η)(1 − x(λ′ )) . (13)
Proof: To address the social welfare (3), we need to find
E(N) and ρs. Using (4) and (10), we can obtain ρs and E(N)
as
4ρs =
∑
n
p(n, 1)q
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)(n+1)
,
E(N) =
∑
n
np(n, 1).
(14)
Then, obtaining the geometric sums in (14) and through (3)
we can arrive (13).
With the observation in (13), we can obtain the socially
optimal strategy, which can be found in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. In the considered model, a unique socially
optimal strategy exists with probability qs of joining the queue
which can be expressed as
qs =


1, ̟s ∈ [ Cµ(1−κ)2 ,+∞),
Φ, ̟s ∈ (Cµ , Cµ(1−κ)2 ),
0, Otherwise.
(15)
where Φ =
√
ϑ(µ̟s−
√
ϑ)(ξ̟s+
√
ϑ)
λϑ̟s
and ϑ = µ̟sC.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
D. Optimal Pricing
We have obtained the socially optimal strategy as well
as the individual equilibrium strategy. Moreover, it can be
observed that the socially optimal joining probability qs is
always smaller than the individual one qe, which can also
be found in Fig. 3. To oblige the SUs to adopt the socially
optimal strategy, one approach is to apply a pricing mechanism
to reduce the individually optimal threshold qe [10]. In this
work, we consider that the BS will act as an agent to impose
an admission fee, which is a constant given the arrival rate,
service pattern, reward and cost. The admission fee is to
force the individually equilibrium probability to equal with
the social optimal one.
When the admission fee is considered, the expected profit
of a SU is given as U(n, p) = θs(̟s −CE(Qn)− p). It can
be observed that when imposing an admission fee, the social
profit remains the same as it implies a transfer of income
from one group to another. Thus, through 21, we can obtain
Γ(qs, qs, p). We further denote that the equilibrium probability
of joining by qe(p). Then the optimal fee p∗ should satisfy
qs = qe(p
∗). As the monopoly market is considered here, and
a monpoly does not allow the a positive user surplus since in
such a case, the price can be increased without reducing q.
Therefore, the p∗ can be arrived by
p∗ = {p|Γp(qs, qs, p) = 0}, (16)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The numerical parameters are λ = 7, ξ = 0.5, µ = 3, η =
2, C = 2. First, in Fig. 3, we can see that the socially
optimal joining probability qs is always smaller than the
individual one qe, and inherently, there is a gap between the
individually equilibrium arrival rate and social arrival rate as
the equilibrium arrival rate and social arrival rate can be given
as λe/s = λqe/s. Therefore, we can see that by imposing
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appropriate admission fee, the arrival rate of SUs can be
regulated. In Fig. 4, we can see that the social benefit when
qs is used is higher than the one when qe is considered.
Comparing Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we can see that only when
qe = 1, the social benefit is higher than 0, otherwise it remains
lower or equal to 0. Meanwhile, the social benefits when qs
is considered is always above 0 and comparable high, which
indicates that appropriate admission fee can improve the social
benefits of the considered system.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of spectrum
access decision-making for the SUs in the CRNs. Utilizing
the queueing game approaches, the decision-making process
of the SUs that whether to queue or not is studied in present
of arrival of the PUs. Both individual equilibrium and social
optimization strategies are derived. Moreover, the optimal pric-
ing of the service provider is also investigated. Our proposed
algorithms and corresponding analysis are validated through
simulation studies.
APPENDIX A
From (4)-(7), we can observe p(0, 0) = ξη+ξ . To obtain
p(n, 1), the similar approach used in [8, pp. 578] can be
5applied. One can notice that (6) can be considered as a
homogeneous linear difference equation of order 2, which is
with constant coefficients and characteristic equation
(λ
′
+ µ+ ξ)y = λ
′
+ µy2. (17)
(17) have too roots, x′(λ′ ) and x(λ′ ), which are
x
′
(λ
′
) =
(λ
′
+ µ+ ξ) +
√
(λ′ + µ+ ξ)2 − 4λ′µ
2µ
,
x(λ
′
) =
(λ
′
+ µ+ ξ)−
√
(λ′ + µ+ ξ)2 − 4λ′µ
2µ
.
(18)
From the standard theory of homogeneous linear difference
equations (see e.g. [14, Sec 2.3]), we conclude that
p(n, 1) = c
′
x
′
(λ
′
)n + cx(λ
′
)n, (19)
where c′ and c are constants. We can easily see that x′ >
1, thus, c′ should be necessarily 0. The constant c can be
calculated using (7) and Proposition 1 can be approved.
APPENDIX B
To prove Proposition 2, first we have the expected profit
when a SU is able to observe n SUs and queue state in the
system upon arrival (i.e. observed queue) and decide to enter,
which can be derived from (10),
U(n) = ̟s
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)(n+1)
− C
ξ
+
C
ξ
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)(n+1)
. (20)
When a SU decides to join given that the BS is serving SUs
and others are following strategy q, the expected profit is
Γ(1, q) =
+ ∞∑
n=0
p1(n, 1)U(n)
=
+∞∑
n=0
p(n, 1)∑+∞
i=0 p(i, 1)
U(n)
=
(
̟s +
C
ξ
)
µ(1− x(λ′ ))
µ+ ξ − µx(λ′) −
C
ξ
,
(21)
where p1(n, 1) = p(n,1)∑+∞
i=0
p(i,1)
is the probability that there are n
SUs in the queue when a SU arrives. As we have that Γ(q˜, q) =
(1− q˜)Γ(0, q)+ q˜Γ(1, q), (11) can be arrived and Proposition
2 can be proved.
APPENDIX C
For a SU, it will prefer to enter the queue if its expected
profit after entering Γ(1, q) > 0, and balk if it Γ(1, q) <
0. Considering Γ(1, q) = 0, we can solve for x(λ′) and the
unique solution is x = 1− Cµ̟s .
We notice that x(λ′ ), λ′ = λq is one root of (17). Then we
are able to solve (17) with respect to q, which yields
qe =
x[µ(1 − x) + ξ]
λ(1 − x) =
(µ̟s − C)(C + ξ̟s)
λC̟s
. (22)
We can also observe that x(λ′) is a strictly increasing
function for q ∈ [0, 1] as dx(λ
′
)
dq > 0. Thus, qe ∈ (0, 1) iff
x(λqe) ∈ (0, κ), where κ = x(λ). In other word, qe is in the
interval (0, 1) iff ̟s ∈ (Cµ , Cµ(1−κ) ).
Moreover, it can be found that when ̟s ≥ Cµ(1−κ) , Γ(1, q)
keeps positive. Thus, the SU’s best response is to join. In
this case, "join" is the unique individual equilibrium. On the
other hand, when ̟s ≤ Cµ , Γ(1, q) becomes negative. In this
case, "balk" is the individuals equilibrium strategy. Therefore,
Theorem 1 can be proved.
APPENDIX D
It can be noticed that (13) can be reformed as S(q) =
f(x(λq)), where f(x) = ηx[mu̟s(1−x)−C](ξ+η)(1−x) . As we can see,
S
′
(q) = 0 can be deduced to f ′(x(λq)) = 0, which means
that we need to solve f ′(x) = 0, that is
µ̟sx
2 − 2µ̟sx+ µ̟s − C = 0. (23)
We can see that the discriminant of the quadratic polynomial
in (23) is less or equal to 0 iff C ≤ 0. We can deduce that
f(x) is increasing and so as S(q). (23) has two roots, which
are
x1 = 1−
√
ϑ
µ̟s
, x2 = 1 +
√
ϑ
µ̟s
. (24)
It is apparently x1 < 1 < x2 and we have following
discussions,
• When x1 ≤ 0, then we have x1 < 0 < κ < x2. Then S(q)
is decreasing in [0, 1] and the social optimal is qs = 0.
We can also see that x1 ≤ 0 implies that ̟s ≤ Cµ .
• When 0 < x1 < κ, then we can see that the maximum
S(q) is obtained for q such that x(q) = x1. By using
(17), substituting x1 for y and solving for q, we obtain
qs =
√
ϑ(µ̟s−
√
ϑ)(ξ̟s+
√
ϑ)
λϑ̟s
. It can be observed that 0 <
x1 < κ means
C
µ < ̟s <
C
µ(1−κ)2 .
• Similarly, when x1 ≥ κ we can have the social optimal
joining probablity is qs = 1 and ̟s ≥ Cµ(1−κ)2 .
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